Needless to say, I've had a bit of an interest in revolutions—and even The Revolution—for quite some time. What counts as a revolution? What are the different kinds? What are the common causes, trajectories and consequences? Of late I have found my interest turning to these issues again. My main interest is in contemporary political situation around the world, especially in eastern Europe. However, it seems to me best to start with "the classics". I have therefore begun to study the English, French and Russian revolutions, as well as state breakdowns in the Ottoman Empire, pre-modern China and Japan. Before I get too far into that, I had occasion to jot down some thoughts on the possible implications of the wave of political rebellion in the former Soviet Union in recent years known as the "colour revolutions".Are colour revolutions a thing of the past in CIS countries?
The colour revolutions in a number of former Soviet countries in the early years of the present decade—the Rose in Georgia in 2003, the Orange in Ukraine in 2004 and the Tulip in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2005—came as something of a surprise to observers, many of whom thought that the cause of democratic development in these countries was either intractable or hopeless.
To understand the potential future relevance of this model of popular political rejuvenation, it is necessary to understand the features and processes that the separate events had in common. All of the political regimes then in existence in these countries might described as semi-democratic at best, in which elites from the communist era were in an alliance of convenience with business factions who had been able to enrich themselves by taking advantage of the market distortions that develop in the transition from planned economies. Additionally, each of the upheavals was sparked by fraudulent national elections, although in all cases extensive violence was avoided.
Operationally, the "colour revolutionaries" faced a weak or divided authority, headed by an unpopular leader who was linked in the public mind with corruption; crucially, the fault lines ran through competing branches of the security services, which made the use of force against the demonstrators more difficult. The revolutionaries were well organised, and used the media—which in all cases remained largely free—as well as modern technology, such as mobile phones and the Internet, to spread information quickly—for example, of the variance between exit polls and official vote results.
Another vital, but controversial, element in the mix was that of technical help from outside. This came not just from Western election-monitoring teams or non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but, notably, from the leaders of the Serbian student movement, Otpor! (Resistance!), which was instrumental in mobilising the opposition that brought down the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia in 2000. (For example, they ran workshops on how to raise funds, and how to "brand" the revolution.)
Not least, the colour revolutions came as a surprise to the region's incumbent governments—which is probably one of the main reasons for their success. We know now, however, that in the wake of the Orange Revolution, Russia's leaders and their political advisers held several high-level meetings to address the question of how to respond systematically to the challenge to their positions represented by these popular disturbances in the "near abroad". The actions of the Russian government since then—its crackdown on domestic opponents, the resubordination of most of the media, and the sparing of no effort to allow any semblance of real competition disturb the desired outcome to the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2007-08—testify to the likely conclusions of these meetings, and are behind the rise of the popular description of Russia's polity under Vladimir Putin as a "managed democracy".
There is some evidence that the "counterrevolutionary" methods so developed have been disseminated to other incumbent governments in the CIS—most recently, perhaps, in the practice in the Kyrgyz Republic in December 2007, where, for all the show of a vibrant and inclusive the parliamentary election, a comprehensive package of electoral, registration and security measures appear to have been in place to prevent the population opting for the wrong result.
Therefore, the short answer is that, yes, colour revolutions are likely to be a thing of the past in the CIS, because the same combination of circumstances is unlikely to recur in just the same way again—not least, because specific measures have been developed to prevent just such an outcome. This does not mean, of course, that the problem of political stability has been solved by the increased authoritarianism that has characterised many CIS regimes in the recent past—this would not be possible until the conditions giving rise to the instability are abolished—but, rather, that any popular, successful political convulsions in the future are likely to happen in creative and unexpected ways, reacting against the reaction.
