If you want things to stay the same, everything has to change

In her recent book, Central Asia’s Second Chance, Martha Brill Olcott attempts to address an apparent contradiction at the heart of contemporary US foreign policy in the Central Asian region. This contradiction is that the failure of the current Bush administration to encourage democratic development more actively—instead relying on partnerships with authoritarian regimes out of short-term expediency linked to the prosecution of the so-called war on terror—risks reproducing long-term security threats to the West because of the potential for ongoing political, social and economic discontent to catalyse anti-Western terrorism.

She argues that the attention and resources of the US administration have been diverted from vital long-term democracy-promotion projects by the war on terror itself, and that this is shown by the low and declining level of US regional funding, which was just US$210m in 2004 (compared with US$1.9bn and US$2.7bn for the more significant US allies, Egypt and Israel, in the same year).

A second important theme of the book is that the nation-building approach adopted by international bodies may have been counterproductive for the region—in particular, in view of the interdependent histories, transport infrastructure, and energy and water resources of the countries involved, the country-specific approach may have encouraged rivalry and protectionism, hindering the development of a regional market.

In some ways, this is a frustrating book, since the author seems to share uncritically the terms and perspectives of the US policy establishment, so that the reader has the feeling of wading through quite a lot of policy-wonk material before getting to a discussion of the details of what has happened regarding the political systems of the Central Asian states themselves (the book might thus more accurately have been called America’s Missed Second Chance in Central Asia).

However, in relation to these political systems, the author makes the points that the countries' leaders were all products of Soviet political structures, and that their emergence, practically intact, from the wreckage of the Soviet Union following the failed Moscow coup of 1991 meant that they lacked the legitimacy that might have been conferred upon them had they risen to power as leaders of independence struggles. Although none of the region’s citizens enjoy as full a range of political rights and civic freedoms as those of the formerly communist countries of central and eastern Europe, there is some variety in the types of political systems that have obtained in Central Asia in the independence period, running along a line from “semi-democratic” to fully authoritarian, with the Kyrgyz Republic usually conceived of as the most democratic and Turkmenistan as the least.

The thesis that US funding was insufficient to allow it to influence positively the political outcomes in the region (in particular, to minimise the chances of political instability by helping to pave the way for the smooth, democratic handover of power) is illustrated by the case of the Kyrgyz Republic. Here, the author argues, such a policy had the best chance of success in the early years of the present decade, because of the country's experience of rapid democratic development in the early 1990s, and because the desire of the then president, Askar Akayev, to compete for prestige with other Central Asian leaders would have predisposed him to accept a high degree of conditionality in return for grant assistance for political reforms already under way, such as of local government, electoral mechanics and anti-corruption programmes. However, the sums involved were too small to yield any decisive influence (funds from the Freedom Support Act for democracy-building were just US$1.16 per head for the Kyrgyz Republic in 2002, although this was the highest per-head level of funding from the US for any country in the region). Instead, therefore, Akayev’s increasing authoritarianism went unchecked, and the chain of events leading up to the Aksy killings of 2002 and resulting in the president’s ouster in the Tulip Revolution of March 2005, while illustrating the greater political influence of public protest in the Kyrgyz Republic relative to its Central Asian neighbours, also began a curious phase of political instability and constitutional struggle that is probably not yet over. Indeed, the regime of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, which replaced Akayev’s, appears to have reproduced many of the features of its predecessor, re-employing many of its personnel, and adopting many of its operation and control techniques.